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VOLUME 70 WINTER 1996 NUMBER 1
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGING
LAWRENCE JOSEPH
I.
"The Language of Judging" was the opening event, on Sep-
tember 30, 1994, of the Rededication of St. John's University
School of Law. The Rededication coincided with the year of the
one hundred twenty-fifth anniversary of St. John's University,
and the dedication of a magnificent new addition to the Law
School. St. John's, a Catholic university founded by the order of
St. Vincent de Paul, the Vincentians, is the largest Catholic uni-
versity in the United States. Since its inception it has served the
New York City metropolitan area, and the Nation as well, in a
unique capacity. The Vincentians are an order committed to
serving those without means; it has always served those in the
New York City area who are from emigre and lower economic
class backgrounds, no matter one's religious beliefs. The force of
the Vincentian commitment at St. John's is to provide the most
excellent education possible to those who otherwise would not
have access to one. Its successes are substantial. The School of
Law numbers among its graduates some of the finest lawyers
and public servants in the Nation. Leonard Boudin, one of the
greatest civil liberties lawyers in the history of the United
States, and Mario Cuomo, one of the most important, intelligent
" Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. B-A., 1970, University
of Michigan; B.A., 1972, Cambridge University; J.D., 1975, University of Michigan;
M.A., 1976, Cambridge University.
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and morally committed public servants in the history of the
State of New York, for example, typify the caliber of an extraor-
dinarily large number of the School of Law's alumnae and
alumni. The Rededication of the School of Law was, in essence, a
rededication on the part of St. John's students, faculty, and
alumni and alumnae, to the objectives of Vincentian excel-
lence-a recommitment to serve, into the twenty-first century,
the highest ideals of the mind, the body politic, and the ever-
complex ideal of justice and all that it involves.
The idea behind "The Language of Judging" was to put to-
gether a small group of the finest legal minds of our time to pre-
sent and exchange their thoughts on a subject that goes to the
core of our legal system. I asked Thomas Grey of Stanford Law
School, Judge John T. Noonan, Jr. of the United States Court of
Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Robin West of Georgetown Law Center,
Martha Nussbaum, now of the University of Chicago, Chief
Judge Richard T. Posner of the United States Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit, and James Boyd White of the University of
Michigan Law School, to be our guests. Happily, they all ac-
cepted. I told them that they did not have to submit papers be-
forehand, that I wanted each of them to speak for twenty min-
utes or so on whatever perspective each wished to bring to the
subject. They could then ask questions of one another, and, after
that, take questions from the audience. Judge Posner, unfortu-
nately, was, at the last moment, unable to attend because of a
rescheduling of a Seventh Circuit judicial conference; he gra-
ciously sent his warmest wishes and regards to the other par-
ticipants, as well as to the St. John's community. The sympo-
sium, held on the morning of a beautiful early autumn day in one
of the School of Law's new lecture spaces turned out to be-not
surprisingly-exceptional. Allowing each speaker to pursue her
or his own sense of the language of judging worked wonderfully:
what occurs is a wide-ranging exchange of perceptions and out-
looks that ends up taking into account much of the most pro-
found thinking being done today on language and judging. For
those fortunate enough to have been present, "The Language of
Judging" remains an intensely memorable experience, which,
now, we can share with you.
II.
My sense of the language of judging began in law school, in
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particular in my second year, in a course on Water Law taught
by Joseph Sax. One of Professor Sax's constant inquiries-as he
took us through an opinion-was, "What is the court doing?"
This, of course, echoed what Holmes, almost a hundred years
ago, said law is--'prophecies of what the courts will do in fact,
and nothing more pretentious."1 Sax's questions made me insis-
tently aware of the complex relationship between what was be-
ing said and what was being done in a judicial opinion. I began
to realize that I'd never seen, or experienced, a language quite
like it. I found myself intrigued by the various dimensions of a
judicial opinion, which appeared to me endless. After law school,
my first job was a two year clerkship with then Justice, later
Chief Justice, G. Mennen Williams of the Michigan Supreme
Court.2 Although the Court held oral argument in Lansing, the
State's capital, Justice Williams had an office, as did three other
justices, in Detroit, where I then lived. Williams had been Gov-
ernor of Michigan for twelve years, until 1960 when he became
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the Kennedy
administration. In the late thirties, Williams worked for Frank
Murphy-whom he always acknowledged as his mentor-in the
Department of Justice. (Prior to becoming Attorney General of
the United States and, then, a Justice of the United States Su-
preme Court, Murphy had been a criminal court judge in Detroit,
Mayor of Detroit, and Governor of Michigan). Justices of the
Michigan Supreme Court are elected (and must claim affiliation
with a political party). Williams, like Murphy, was a highly suc-
cessful politician; his experience as an Executive had given him
substantial insight into the ways in which political power ex-
pressed itself in the courts. Like many judges, Justice Williams
usually had his law clerks write the first drafts of his opinions.
He treated his clerks as associates, listening to what we said and
how we said it. Drafting opinions for Justice Williams-I was
going to say that it greatly added to my understanding of the
language of judging, but that would be an understatement. The
tension, the pressure, the problematic space between what
judges say and what judges are in fact doing, deepened in me
considerably.
'Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461
(1897).
2 1 have written a memoir of my clerkship with Justice Williams. See Justice G.
Mennen Williams:A Memoir, 66 U. DET. L. REV. 339 (1989).
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I could articulate this tension in jurisprudential terms, but
this is not the place for that.3 I will say this, though: since com-
pleting my clerkship in 1978, legal thinkers-law professors,
judges, practicing lawyers-have delved into issues of judicial
language with a depth and intensity that startles language
thinkers in other disciplines. Let me put it another way: at the
end of a century of astonishing change in the profession and the
practice of law, we are, as lawyers, more and more aware of lan-
guage, especially the language of judging. Every theory of law
(and every lawyer carries within her or him a spectra of theories)
propounds issues of language. Every judge, and every lawyer
who imagines what a judge might do (which is to say, every law-
yer), employs theories of how to interpret legal meaning-what
words mean. How opinions are or should be written, why they
are written as they are, what the language in an opinion is say-
ing and doing, are, clearly, among our most practical legal is-
sues. My objective in "The Language of Judging" was, simply, to
allow five of our most astute legal thinkers the opportunity to
probe freely new ways of talking and thinking about one of our
most vital languages-the language of those among us whose
practice is judging. As you will see, what I hoped for was more
than fulfilled.
' I have explored certain dimensions of law and language in several essays. See,
e.g., Reflections on Law and Literature (Imaginary Interview), 59 SASK. L. REV.
(forthcoming Fall 1996); Theories of Poetry, Theories of Law, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1227
(1993).
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